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Vous autres Europeéns -  or Inventing Europe* 
J. G. A. Pocock
et me begin by presenting myself and the standpoint from which I am
giving this lecture. I aim at looking critically at the concept of »Europe« 
from the standpoint o f one outside that entity yet not belonging to another 
civilisation. I am not a European because I am an Antipodean; yet I speak the 
same language, I live by the same values, and I have at least some of the same 
historic memories as many of you. What then does it mean to learn that I am 
not »European«, and what is this »Europe« to which I do not belong? In 
»Deconstructing Europe« I set about enquiring into the meaning of the term 
and -  as my title implied -  seeking to deprive it of self-evidence and givenness; 
in other words, demystifying it.
This is not necessarily a hostile enterprise. People may be the better for it if 
they are obliged to operate their collective self-awareness critically and self- 
critically, and it should do you no harm if I ask you who you think you are and 
what you think you have been doing. But when I interrogate you about your 
identity, I do so in a spirit o f self-defence and even retaliation, because you 
have been radically disturbing my identity as a by-product of what you have 
been doing. I am an Antipodean, a New Zealander; and I used to live in a 
British ecumene and common citizenship, with its own body o f shared memo­
ries and so on -  including the dead o f several wars -  which was terminated, to 
a large degree unilaterally, by the United Kingdom's decision to become 
European and lessen all ties with the rest of us. There are all sorts of ways of 
discussing and defending this decision, and all I want to point out is that it was 
done to me and many others, rather than by us or with our consent. The British,
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with whom we had been so much accustomed to converse about common 
concerns that we regarded ourselves as part o f their body and even called 
ourselves by their name, abruptly left us to become members o f another 
community and conversation, under the name of Europe, from which we were 
excluded. Were we, therefore, British any more; alternatively, were they? 
When, about the time all this was happening, an American colleague asked me 
if it was true that New Zealanders were more British than the British them­
selves, 1 felt able to reply that it was certainly true now. This may or may not 
be a time of the breaking of nations; it is certainly a time o f their deconstruction.
This experience does things to one's sense o f identity, o f others' identity as 
well as o f one's own. I shall not speak further about New Zealand's continuing 
search for identity; I intend rather to speak about how I see your own. I wish 
you well, you will understand, but I do not love you. I wish you well, because 
there is enormous potential good in what you are trying to do, and because I 
share a common historical ancestry and birthright with you; but I do not love 
you, because you deny me what I thought was my share in that birthright. I am 
one o f the eggs you have broken in making European omelette; and I am not 
even going to be mixed into the substance o fthat omelette, but cast out in the 
fragments of my former shell, enjoined by you rather than by myself to grow a 
new shell, and not much helped to do so by the protectionism which is so 
conspicuous a feature of European policies. My feelings are exacerbated by 
my awareness that you and we do in fact share a common civilisation. It 
extends beyond »Europe« into other oceans, continents and islands; it is 
conventionally known as »Western« civilisation -  a term itself none the worse 
o f a little deconstruction -  and among the things you have been doing is 
walling yourselves off from the rest of it, while claiming yourselves to embody 
its ecumenical traditions and values. I know what it is like to find myself 
excluded from »Europe«, while being told at the same time that I may not 
object because my culture is »European« anyway. This fills me with an 
anticolonialist anger, issuing in an impulse to scrutinise the concept itself with 
an attentiveness not altogether free from malice. I need to construct my own 
definition of »Europe«, from my own standpoint within our common civilisation, 
one necessarily not the same as yours. Hence the bilingual title o f this lecture: 
»Vous autres Europeéns, or inventing Europe«. It is my attempt to continue 
deconstructing a concept which I see as at once universal and exclusionary -  
characteristics which may form a definition o f empire.
What then is this »Europe« which you and I may join in discerning from our 
several standpoints, and how might it be defined and delimited? Since a certain 
lightness of tone is appropriate to the discussion I wish to initiate, I will start 
by showing you a picture (seethe reproduction on page 143-44). Some months
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ago I was in a heartland o f Europe, at the royal and republican city of Prague; 
and in the Strahov Monastery Museum there I bought a print first published 
four hundred years ago in 1592, by a Czech printer from the designs o f an 
Innsbruck draughtsman. »Europe« is »the first division of the earth in the form 
of a virgin«, and yet it is hard to think of anything less virgin than Europe as 
revealed in her history. She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like 
the vampire she has been dead many times and knows the secrets of the grave. 
But one would rejoice to learn that her youth if not her virginity may be 
renewed as the eagle, and imperial symbolism indeed pervades the picture. Her 
crowned head is the monarchy o f Spain including Portugal; the medal at her 
waist is the kingdom of Bohemia, depending as the text insists from the Black 
Forest and the Rhine; her right arm is the peninsula of Italy -  or as the map 
calls it »W elshland«- and grasps the imperial orb, the island of Sicily; her left, 
which is the peninsula of Jutland, holds a sceptre with which she gestures, a 
shade ineffectually, through the Skagerrak and the Straits of Orkney. The 
Tyrolese draughtsman, living a generation before this print was made, had 
been a pious subject o f the Empire of Charles V.
But to understand this figure properly, one must notice what the colour scheme 
excludes from her mystical body. Parts of Africa and Asia are set apart, as is 
Scandinavia north of the Baltic (or Mare Sarmaticum); and we cannot fail to 
observe those two large and shapeless islands, beyond her sceptre's reach, with 
which the cartographer was plainly ill acquainted -  through by 1592 the 
Spanish flo ta  had come to know their stern and rockbound coasts all too well. 
The use o f the colour green excludes Hibernia, Scotia et Anglia from empire 
and even from Europe, while including Funen and Zealand in the north, 
Corsica, Sardinia and Malta in the south. We will see too that the Danube 
originates in the area of the lady's right breast and flows east, even to the skirts 
o f her raiment, where its many mouths into the Black Sea are quite clearly 
marked. This is an exception to what is otherwise the rapid exhaustion of the 
cartographer's knowledge; for the rest, her skirts float free in a wind from the 
steppe, forming vast regions vaguely marked »Sarmatia«, »Russia«, »Lithuania«, 
»Transylvania«, »Walachia«, »Bulgaria« and »Graecia«, and 1 don't know 
whether the blackish discolourations on this part of the map represent the 
injuries o f time or the ignorance o f the geographer. The flounce or mini-train 
at the bottom of the picture is the Peloponnese, but the draughtsman knew less 
about the Aegean and the Hellespont than one would expect of a contemporary 
o f Andrea Doria and Khaireddin Barbarossa; and the city o f Constantinople is 
situated just within the hem of her garment in a way of which the less said the 
better.
What may one learn from this image concerning the invention of Europe, 
bearing in mind that inventio may mean discovery, construction or fiction? Let
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me suggest, as one answer, a visible uncertainty o f demarcation. It was easier 
for the artist to include the islands of the inner seas than those of the outer. Was 
the great archipelago beyond the German ocean part o f the continent or not? 
Only when included in empire, perhaps; but whose empire? The crowned 
empress grasps the orb in security, because it is Sicily -  safe within the inland 
sea, if  not a very safe part of it to visit -  but her sceptre points westward into 
the outer ocean, and she does not seem to know what she is doing with it. 
There is no sign of the great new dominions of Mexico, Peru and the Philip­
pines, all established by 1592 when this map was printed; they were included 
within the Spanish monarchy but not within Europe, and yet it is the Spanish 
and German monarchy which provides this definition of Europe. This ambigu­
ity, I suggest, informs us of a continuing uncertainty in the mind of »Europe« 
concerning the oceans which Europeans were about to conquer, and the new 
societies they were about to create through conquest, settlement and com­
merce. You made us, and now you don't want us; a good part of your European 
enterprise is directed at keeping us out.
Part o f »the invention of Europe« in therefore delimitation, the denial and 
dismissal of discoveries you made, which are parts o f the invention o f your 
self. Let me return to that contrast between the inner and the outer seas which 
is inherent in the image still before you. It informs us that »Europe« is a 
peninsula, defined by its seacoasts on three sides. Therefore, »Europe« is not 
in fact a continent, but a sub-continent; thrust out like India from the Eurasian 
landmass, but lacking anything like the Himalaya to mark it off decisively on 
the landward side. Here, of course, we encounter a second major zone of 
indeterminacy or uncertain demarcation: that marked by the skirts o f the 
imperial robe, which drift freely and indicate broad and undemarcated areas in 
what is equally Eastern Europe and Western Eurasia. It was in vain that the 
Innsbruck extended the Black Sea as far north as he dared, hoping that it might 
somehow make contact with the Baltic by way of the Pripet marshes. There is 
and has been no natural frontier of any kind, north of the Danube and its exit 
into the Black Sea, between what we call Europe and the general landmass of 
northern and central Eurasia. Looked at in one way, the vast level areas of that 
continent penetrate deeply into the mountains and river basins o f »Europe« as 
the term is familiar to us; nomadic and Islamic power have on occasion made 
deep and more than momentary inroads by way of the Hungarian plain. 
Looked at in another, the same geography has laid Eurasia open to even deeper 
penetration by the forms of power and social organisation we recognise as 
»European«; and north of the Anatolian and Caucasian plateaux and moun­
tains there are no natural features -  other than distance itself -  which have 
imposed limitations to this oscillation o f history. When western statesmen, 
Charles de Gaulle and Mikhail Gorbachev, have spoken o f a »Europe« extend-
Vous autres Europeéns -  or Inventing Europe 147
ing »from the Atlantic to the Urals«, they have consciously or otherwise raised 
the question o f what happens when we reach the Urals and whether there is any 
reason for stopping when we get there. Mr. Gorbachev was o f course aware 
that the Russian Federal Republic continues to the east of that range; and if the 
forces o f history do not sunder that state's cis-Uralic from its trans-Uralic 
components, and if  we continue to regard »Russia« as part o f »Europe« -  these 
are two large but by no means impossible assumptions -  there will be no 
reason against speaking of a »Europe« which extends to the northern Pacific 
Ocean and the Bering Straits. There is no way of avoiding decisions as to 
where »Europe« does or does not leave off, and these have to be taken in 
respect o f very large areas in which there are no geographical, cultural or 
historical landmarks to protect you in making one determination or another. In 
the Eurasian landmass the frontiers of »Europe« are so far indeterminate that 
they can only be arbitrarily determined; and two relevant characteristics of an 
empire are, first, that it has the power to take such decision, second, that it has 
not the power to free itself from the need to take them. This is why the imperial 
aspect o f »Europe« is a good deal more pronounced than the virginal.
The Spanish-Bohemian image, further, does not show the Mediterranean, the 
southern inland sea determining the shape of Europe, as an interconnected 
whole, and this is important for two sets of reasons. In the first place, the 
Greek, Latin, Jewish and Christian components of our civilisation were formed 
in various Mediterranean coastlands -  some now in Europe and some not -  and 
we have to consider their migration northwards, to the alps, rivers, ploughlands 
and highlands, coasts and oceans, which delineate the contours of the Euro­
pean peninsula. In the second place, the Mediterranean has been and remains a 
vital encounter zone between continents and civilisations; Europe, Asia and 
Africa meet there, we say, though it is just as true to say that these three names 
are themselves Mediterranean, names of littorals extended ever deeper into the 
hinterlands behind them until they reached the ends of the earth (which of 
course aren't ends at all) and became names of continents in the geographical 
and global sense. But the Mediterranean littorals, with that sea as their centre, 
once formed a cultural zone corresponding to none of these names, and what 
we call »Europe« is in many ways a consequence of its disruption. The Latin 
variant o f ancient Mediterranean civilisation moved into alpine and riverine 
»Europe« with the Roman empire along the Rhine and the Danube; and 
»Europe« is the fruit o f the survival and expansion of the western and Latin 
provinces of that empire, some of them continental and some Mediterranean. 
We can of course make no sense o f these historical processes without taking 
account of that huge reversal of imperial Hellenism, the Arab and Muslim 
counter-occupation o f Mesopotamia, Egypt and ancient Africa (today's 
Maghreb); or the much later Ottoman conquests in the Aegean and Balkan
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regions. Since those events the Mediterranean basin has been the theatre of 
profound conflicts as well as a profound unity; we have to rewrite history 
rather drastically if we are to ignore the former, and one has not heard lately 
that Muslim North Africa is part of Europe, despite the immigrant patterns of 
its population. What we call Europe exits in confrontation and inter-penetra­
tion with Islam; we may say that Islam is part o f the history o f Europe and vice 
versa, but I do not expect to hear that the history o f Islam is the history of 
Europe or vice versa. By the term Europe we normally mean something else; 
and the artist ofthe imperial Spanish virgin was unable to depict the Ottoman 
presence at all.
His map does however remind us that we are talking about the formation, 
expansion and uncertain demarcation o f cultures in peninsular Europe be­
tween the seas, abutting on the Mediterranean basin but never occupying it as 
an undivided zone. I have seen it written that the Mediterranean components of 
our civilisation are the true, because the Catholic, Europe; but in Lombardy 
and Tuscany you may hear that Africa or Arabia begins somewhere just south 
of Rome, and the »Europe« meeting in Edinburgh has a Franco-Netherlandish- 
German consortium at its foundations. »Europe« is peninsular rather than 
wholly Mediterranean, and is therefore Eurasian as well. We have a Europe 
between the seas with an open and fluid frontier towards northern and central 
Eurasia, and a mountainous, military and still bitterly contested frontier zone 
towards the Hellespont. How, though, did this Europe acquire a cultural 
identity and what identity did it acquire?
What we call »Europe« is the product o f the expansion -  in many directions, 
but especially eastward into the open gate o f Eurasia -  o f Latin Christian and 
post-Christian culture in its three principal forms: Catholic, Protestant and 
Enlightened. To say this uncritically is o f course to give that culture hege­
mony; but when we say it critically we discover that establishing hegemony is 
precisely what that culture has been aiming to do and is still doing, and that 
this is a story it is important to know how to tell -  especially as you haven't 
finished with doing it. We could begin, therefore, looking at this Latin dyna­
mism by inspecting the origins o f that Frankish and Christian eastward expan­
sion into what we now call Germany and Central Europe, beginning some­
where in the eleventh century and having as its by-product the strange and 
partly maritime adventure of the Crusades. The great Belgian historian Henri 
Pirenne went back to the eighth century, and suggested a relationship between 
Mohammed and Charlemagne: that is, between Arab control o f the African 
shore and the east and central Mediterranean, and the formation o f that Latin 
and papal Frankish empire which was to undertake expansion into the penin­
sula between the seas. The relationship turned out so difficult to specify that
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the attempt to do so is now abandoned; but Pirenne remains among the authors 
of the grand perception that the history of »Christendom« and o f »Europe« is 
not to be understood without understanding its interactions with Islam. A later 
advance of Islamic power and culture - th a t  of the Ottoman Turks, which in the 
sixteenth century had got so far as to threaten the middle Danube and the 
Adriatic shores o f Italy, though our Innsbruck draughtsman made no attempt to 
show it -  can be made to coincide with the two great explosions of trade, 
power and culture beyond the peninsula, which have made »Europe« a global 
entity. I mean o f course the navigation of the Atlantic and the oceans in 
general, the irruption of European raiders and merchants into the Muslim- 
controlled Indian Ocean, the discovery of new continents as theatres of Euro­
pean settlement and empire; and about the same time, the expansion of Musco­
vite settlement into Siberia, creating a »Russia« within which the Urals are not 
a terminal phenomenon. But obviously, the second expansion tells against my 
rule, since it is not carried out by a Latin, feudal or post-feudal civilisation, but 
by one deeply Greek Orthodox and post-Byzantine in its culture, till recently a 
Mongol satellite, and more closely involved with Eurasian nomadism than 
Latin Europe ever came to be. We can therefore say at will that this »Russia« is 
or that it is not part of »Europe« -  the Spanish lady doesn't know it is there -  
and we need not ask whether western Russians feel towards Siberians the same 
irritated and obsessive petulance that Europeans display towards Americans 
and other nations founded by their settlement. It is necessary to add, however, 
that half a century ago it was a commonplace among historians that the age of 
Europe had ended and been succeeded by a Russian-American bipolar world 
hegemony, as a result o f which all the history books had to be rewritten then 
and are having to be rewritten again now.
Frankish and Latin culture makes its way eastward, as well as westward into 
the oceans, encountering a succession of Saxon, Polish, Baltic, Russian and 
Eurasian universes, with which it interacts in ways that prohibit our thinking of 
the latter as merely passive subjects of colonisation. Like others, they were 
colonised, but like others they responded vigorously to the process; but as we 
move eastward through this chain of Latin-non-Latin encounters, each be­
comes involved in the inherently non-soluble question of where »Europe« 
leaves o ff and what it encounters when it does so. An insoluble problem, I have 
called it, yet one to which, it would seem, you of the European Community are 
going to have to supply a series of arbitrary and provisional answers. With 
what do you want to concern yourselves, as you look eastwards? Will you have 
the power to keep yourselves from involvement in that in which you don't want 
to become involved? In the first half of the century now ending, problems of 
this kind helped produce huge and appalling wars between the great states of 
Europe; this pretty certainly won't happen again, but the problems are still
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there. In a perfectly real sense, you cannot use the word »Europe« without 
arousing them, and this should be a warning against using the word as a magic 
incantation which causes all problems to disappear. The strength o f »Euro­
pean« thought is, or should be, that it is anti-magical.
As Latin Christian culture moved deeper into the west Eurasian peninsula, 
constructing what we know as »Central Europe« and the problems of its 
relations with »Eastern Europe« and the »Middle East«, it underwent the 
major historical changes we all know about, or should. There was the division 
of Latin Christian civilisation into Protestant and Catholic, giving rise to the 
extremely destructive Wars of Religion which proved so hard to bring under 
control, especially when they were revived and continued in this archipelago 
just as they were winding down on the continent. There was the power rivalry 
between the Spanish, French and Austrian monarchies, complicated by the 
commercial ascendancy of the Dutch confederate republic. And in the last 
years of the seventeenth century, we may note the beginnings o f what we call 
Enlightenment, which may be characterised as a determination to subject 
religious conflict to civil authority, even if this meant the destruction o f the 
orthodox Christian theology on which the authority of the Church and its 
power to disturb the civil order were thought to rest. This programme was 
encouraged by an increase in the organisation o f wealth and stability in many 
lands o f western Europe, making it more possible for both states and societies 
to hold themselves together. During the eighteenth century, and extending 
deep into lands of German settlement, philosophers from Adam Smith's Glasgow 
to Immanuel Kant's Königsberg found themselves taking as their principal 
theme the relations between the two entities o f »state« and »civil society« and 
rewriting history around this perception. By the second quarter o f that century, 
it was usual to characterise »Europe« as having emerged from a condition of 
»universal empire«, and consisting o f a concert or confederation -  even a 
»republic« -  of equally sovereign states, held together by the ties o f commerce 
and cultural exchange which had rendered obsolete wars of both conquest and 
religion. To a quite startling degree, it is the continued status o f that Enlight­
ened order which »Europe« finds itself debating in the closing years o f the 
twentieth century; so much so that the two centuries of world revolutions and 
world wars, running from 1789 to 1989, are coining to present a major problem 
in historical understanding. It is still the question o f how the state stands in 
relation to civil society, and both in relation to global commerce, which 
troubles your deliberations; and not yours alone.
The values o f western or Latin Europe which spread eastward came to be those 
of Enlightenment. It was not to Catholic or Protestant religion, but to Swedish, 
Dutch and English methods of organising commerce, state and (up to a point)
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civil society, that Peter the great turned in attempting the transformation of 
Russia; and from there to Japan, Enlightenment figured as an instrument of 
modernisation. But in saying that, I have raised the spectres o f cultural imperi­
alism and colonialism; and the first anticolonialist ideologies are both Enlight­
ened and European. German romantic nationalism, originating about 1770, 
was in part a protest against French cultural hegemony, first in its absolutist 
and then in its revolutionary form; Russian Slavophilism, o f which we hear 
perhaps half a century later, is a rebellion in the name of Orthodox, Muscovite 
and peasant values against all the »European« or »Western« hegemonies 
imported by the modernising Petrine and Catherinian regime -  including those 
of Enlightenment in its French Encyclopedic, German bureaucratic, and Brit­
ish utilitarian forms. In both the German and Russian cases, we encounter that 
dynamic and dangerous concept of the Volk, in whom spirit reigns rather than 
intellect, and who claim an immediate and instinctive unity with the earth from 
which they are sprung and the history which is their communion with their 
ancestors. All around the globe this is now the received rhetoric of 
anticolonialism, and we cling to the image of the noble shaman who has 
replaced the noble savage; that is, to the belief that autochthonous or aborigi­
nal peoples are at unity with the cosmos and less likely to devastate it than we 
who lie under the curse o f Adam, or have invented it to justify our exploitation 
of the earth. There is plenty o f truth in this rhetoric, yet since it was created 
early in Europe's global expansion and within the moving Eurasian border­
lands of »Europe« itself, we have to ask, wherever in the world we encounter 
it, how far it has been generated by the Volk themselves, how far by some 
combination of Westernising and even Western intellectuals, allied in an anti- 
Westernism which may be the rebellion of Europe against itself as well as of 
the world against Europe. Self-repudiation is a characteristic, and sometimes a 
weapon, o f a culture which bases itself on the myth of the Fall.
The German Volk and the Slavic narod appear where the expanding power of 
the Enlightened state approaches the vast and lightly populated spaces of 
northern Eurasia, but they can also be found in the zones of encounter between 
Hapsburg, Ottoman and Romanov -  with Hohenzollern as an increasingly 
powerful fourth -  which make east European history a history of empire and of 
encounter with Islam, in which the Enlightened parallel growth o f state and 
civil society does not operate or operates differently. The Western Enlightened 
notion that the age o f conquest and empire was ended functioned less well as 
the peninsula broadened out towards Eurasia. To the southeast, there prevailed 
a zone o f military empires and their frontiers -  rapidly collapsing in the 
Ottoman case -  whose history may be worth remembering today. Should you 
decide -  as I believe you are from time to time pressed to decide -  that modern 
Turkey is part of your European Community, you will have to decide that
152 J. G. A. Pocock
Ottoman as well as Anatolian history is part o f the history o f Europe; unless 
indeed, as is sometimes asserted, »Europe« is a conspiracy to do away with the 
relevance, and the memory, of history altogether. There are historians who 
urge us to focus less on the free and warlike republics o f Mediterranean 
antiquity and more on the huge beneficent empires o f Egypt, Mesopotamia and 
Macedon, of which Rome and Byzantium were the successors. I have read the 
work o f Polyhymnia Athanassiadi, a modern Greek historian o f late antiquity, 
who claims that she may be better equipped than Western and American 
scholars to understand a late Roman emperor like Julian the Apostate, because 
her historic memory is formed by the ecumenism and quasi-tolerance of the 
Ottoman empire. Now if, along these lines, you were to resolve that the 
Ottoman was the successor to the Byzantine ecumene, a zone or dar-ul-Islam  
of interacting hegemonies over Muslim, Orthodox and other populations, you 
might have the means of regarding its history as not generically unlike those o f 
the other empires with which it interacted, and you might be able to ask how 
far the modern Turkish decision to break with the Ottoman past, and pursue 
identity as a secular national state, is like, and how far unlike, that of similar 
decisions taken by peoples more conventionally defined as »European«. You 
might discover a »Europe« shaped by a Muslim presence in it, not merely 
external pressure upon it; no bad thing, perhaps, when you must wonder 
whether angry Bosnians and Albanians will turn to some neo-ghazi militancy 
and »Europe« must interact with an Arab Maghreb all along the Mediterranean 
littoral to the Atlantic.
You might therefore supply Turkey with a history European enough to have 
played a major role in the shaping o f »Europe«; come to that, I possess a book 
which offers a history of the Mongols as one o f »the peoples o f Europe«. Two 
considerations seem to me to arise from this still hypothetical case. One is that 
such ecumenisms are possible only because the delimitation o f »Europe« is 
indeterminable; which does not mean that her frontiers are infinitely exten­
sible, but that they interact with ever-increased complexity with people and 
cultures whose identity is not »European«. There is a history o f Islam to which 
Turks will continue to belong, since you can belong to two histories at once; 
ant it is not a history of »Europe«. The fact that you cannot build a wall where 
one leaves off and the other begins means that they are interactive but not that 
they are indistinguishable. If modern Turkey has one foot in Europe, it has 
another on the Iranian plateau, and I do not think the Kurds believe that 
»Europe« has reached them yet. I do not even know whether they want it to. 
My second generalisation from the scenario o f Turkish history would be that 
whenever you admit a new people into the community o f »Europe« -  be they 
Turkish or British or Swiss -  you have to rewrite the history o f »Europe«, not 
simply to »include« them -  whatever »include« may mean -  but in order to
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make it intelligible how »Europe« looks when they are part o f it, and what 
»Europe« is once it is admitted that they, whoever »they« may be, have been 
agents in shaping it and making it; so that »Europe« with »them« is a different 
place, and has a different history, from Europe without them. In saying this, I 
am affirming that »Europe« is a convergence of many histories within, as well 
as possessing open and indeterminable frontiers without; and I am affirming a 
conviction that »Europe« is a product of converging and colliding histories, 
not a device for abolishing those histories in a kind of postmodernist melting- 
pot. It is this conviction which may prove contestable.
The eighteenth century, in which my own work is concentrated, is as it 
happens a good period in which to look for some origins of what I have just 
termed postmodernism in the diverse structures of »Europe«. In the older lands 
o f the Latin West, it was believed that empire was obsolete, commerce replac­
ing conquest, and the ties of commerce -  material and cultural exchange -  
linking sovereign states together in an informal confederation or république 
des patries, whose recurrent wars could be contained and need not become 
wars to the death like the wars o f religion. The more fortunate of the Western 
states -  o f which Scotland was outstandingly determined to become, or to join, 
one -  were held to be commercial societies, in which ties of the same kind held 
the citizens together in civil society or bürgerliche Gesellschaft, and this 
interacted with the sovereign structure of the state in ways that guaranteed 
liberty for both the state and the citizen. In Edinburgh and Glasgow there were 
written some classical expositions of this never unproblematic relation, and 
the interactions between political and civil society still form the central theme 
of liberal political thought. But as the historical eye travels eastward, into the 
heartlands o f the European peninsula, it comes upon regions where conquest 
and empire were by no means at an end, and large agglomerations of power 
were being formed in that area o f undetermined frontiers. The Hapsburg and 
Romanov empires were growing increasingly professionalised in their military 
and bureaucratic structures, as they pushed back the structure of the Ottoman 
system, and in the Russian case converted the last defensive wars of European 
settlers against nomad raiders from the Crimea, into offensive operations of 
conquest and agriculture. The Hohenzollern monarchy intervened in the rela­
tions between empires in ways that helped bring about the partitions of Poland
-  which Edmund Burke, who was a great theorist o f Europe, considered a blow 
to the civilisation o f states second only to the French Revolution. The question 
it seems fair to extract from this summary is whether, as these empires grew 
and modernised themselves, they instituted among the various ethnic groups 
they brought under government enough of the conditions conducive to what 
further west was called »civil society« to ensure that the state was liberalised, 
and that middle-class and popular politics did not develop predominantly in
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the form of competing ethnic nationalisms. This 1 understand to be a dominant 
problem in central and eastern European history, where there may be found 
ethnic cultures in which the partnership between state and civil society has not 
yet developed to the point where the preconditions o f liberalism can be met; 
more perhaps than in the west o f the peninsula, though a comparable problem 
is to be found there too. Modern Italy, for example, can be said to include both 
northern provinces in which civil society is strong enough to make the state, 
never much respected, look almost superfluous, and southern provinces in 
which organised crime is as strong as the state and can make it fight to assert 
its authority. We don't know which has won yet, and on the American side of 
the Atlantic the story isn't over either.
I have heard it said while visiting Calabria that the peoples o f southern Italy 
have been required to pass from a premodern to a postmodern state o f life at 
one step, which no one could be expected to find easy. As far back as the 
eighteenth century it is possible to find some of the origins o f this widespread 
problem and some interesting comments on its genesis. Here in Edinburgh it is 
proper to remember that farsighted dreamer Andrew Fletcher o f Saltoun, who 
distrusted the formation of the multiple kingdoms of Britain into a single 
military monarchy to oppose the military monarchy of France. He proposed an 
utopia in which the great states o f Europe would be dissolved into a loose 
federation of cantons, resembling the Swiss model, each with its own militia 
and its commerce linking it with its neighbours. The sovereignty of each would 
clearly be confined to its local affairs and the protection o f its borders, and 
Fletcher was up against the contention that sovereignty should be used to 
organise larger states which would be larger market areas. That was the 
solution that attracted both David Hume and Adam Smith, but the former was 
a particularly pungent commentator on the practice great states had developed 
of financing themselves by contracting larger and larger national debts, mort­
gaged to assoc iations of creditors in the present against a future in which they 
would probably never be paid off at all. In a famous essay »Of Public Credit« 
Hume asked what would happen to a state -  and it might happen to all states -  
whose total national wealth was perpetually employed in paying off creditors 
who were not members of the state, but lived somewhere abroad, interested in 
the state solely as the source of their income. He concluded that the state would 
be stripped of all authority over itself derived from the social relations among 
its members, while the creditors would exercise their power with the »stupid 
and pampered lethargy« which arose from their being members o f no political 
or civil society. Shall I say merely that we know what he was talking about? 
The postmodern condition is certainly one in which membership in separate 
and identifiable civil societies is losing its central importance; do we any 
longer control our own affairs?
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In a study which I am constructing o f the historical thought o f Edward Gibbon,
I am struck by the extent to which the Europe he knew was English, French, 
Dutch, Swiss and Italian, limited to that republic or confederation of states 
which had succeeded the universal monarchy of Charles V and the Innsbruck 
draughtsman, and held together by trade, treaties and the balance of power. 
Through he served in a war which changed the Anglo-French competition for 
hegemony in western Europe into a struggle for empire in North America, 
Gibbon was very little aware o f the great struggle between Hapsburg, 
Hohenzollern and Romanov which was part of the same war. Though the 
history he wrote was set chiefly in the Pontic, Eurasian and east Mediterranean 
lands surrounding the Byzantine empire, he did not, on reaching the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453, go on to consider the Ottoman as successor to the 
Byzantine, or the empires of his own day as successors to the Ottoman and 
Mongol systems; instead, he returned to the west he lived in and wrote three 
chapters on the city o f Rome in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. When 1 
began my work on Gibbon a few years ago, the European Community you are 
trying to construct was confined to the Europe he knew. It was a far western 
consortium, divided by an ironclad frontier from the latest of the bureaucratic 
and military empires which have succeeded one another in that central and 
eastern European, and at the same time western Eurasian zone, in which they 
were taking their modern shape in Gibbon's lifetime. In the last three years, 
however, that configuration of things has become the memory of another age 
in the world's history. What has collapsed is not merely that intolerable but 
unquestionable frontier we knew by such names as the Wall and the Curtain, 
and not merely the military empire which the Soviet Union exercised in 
Europe for only half a century; not merely the Soviet Union itself, but a very 
large part o f the imperial state built up by the Romanov dynasty from the time 
at which our Innsbruck draughtsman was making his picture of the crowned 
Spanish virgin. There is now a zone of global proportions in which what we 
vaguely call »European Russia« may or may not extend beyond the Urals, 
from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok; there is another, not to be marked off from 
the first, in which that Russia may or may not interact stably with the tier of 
Turkic and Islamic peoples whom the Romanovs spent two centuries subjugat­
ing, and with the modernised Islamic states south of them. We don't know how 
far the disintegration o f the Russian state and empire may be going to extend, 
and as a result the community of states, or ex-states, which takes to itself the 
name of »Europe«, is in contact with a zone extending from the centre of the 
European peninsula into the heartlands of Eurasia, in which what is taking 
shape may be a new system of states, a chaos of imperfectly stabilised states, 
or a recrudescence o f empire in one form or another. In this scenario the 
boundaries of »Europe« cannot be fixed any more than they could in 1592,
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although -  or rather because -  there is no successor to the Ottoman empire in 
the pride of its power. Those boundaries have not expanded, so much as 
exploded, into a geopolitical space without natural frontiers; and this affects, 
without determining, both the structure o f »Europe« itself and its future inter­
actions with Islamic culture from northern Africa to central Asia -  with some 
significant Muslim presences in the peninsula, even the archipelago, which 
goes by the name of »Europe«. I am not trying to present Islam as any kind of 
threat, merely as part of a general pattern o f entropy in which there are 
problems but not the imperial will or power to determine them.
Western Europe in Gibbon's time believed itself to be a post-imperial condi­
tion, in which the need of any kind of European empire had been superseded 
by the growth of a society of independent states, each sovereign in its political 
affairs -  and therefore capable o f war with its neighbours -  but held together 
by ties of commerce which created a common culture and mitigated war 
without threatening sovereignty (though we have seen that David Hume could 
envisage conditions in which the fluidity o f capital might render external and 
internal sovereignty equally meaningless). In what I have proposed calling the 
revolutionary period, from 1789 to 1989, a series o f causes combined to make 
both the great states of western Europe and the great empires o f western 
Eurasia capable of fighting hugely destructive wars which became contests for 
empire and involved other powers on a scale global as well as European. The 
invention of »Europe« -  as a byword for the specific set o f institutions called 
the »European Community« -  was a device intended to put an end to the 
conduct of great wars within the European Peninsula; it resembled the Enlight­
enment creation of a society o f states held together by a shared commerce, 
with the important difference that Enlightened »Europe« was built upon the 
sovereignty of the individual state, whereas postmodern »Europe« affects to 
regard that sovereignty as itself obsolete and dangerous and presents the global 
fluidities of the world economy as a means o f dissolving it.. Not merely a 
means, indeed, but an end in itself. The word »Europe« is employed to 
promote a vision of culture and history in which the movements o f the world 
market are more central, in determining human life and supplying it with 
meaning, than membership in any political community, local, national, re­
gional, or continental. It is not clear to an observer like myself, and as far as I 
can observe it is not clear to you either, whether you are contemplating 
surrendering your sovereignty (in part if not in whole) to some new sovereign 
association larger that the state, or to some set o f arrangements designed to 
ensure that no kind of political sovereignty has the capacity to interfere with 
the operations of the market. Are you or are you not engaged in putting an end 
to the contention, very ancient and central in our culture, that the human being 
is primarily a political animal, and that political societies are the means by
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which selves govern themselves and endeavour to declare what they are to be? 
The advanced voices of our culture are busy decentering, deconstructing and 
otherwise rendering insecure the notion of the self, and the global consumer 
market seems the most likely beneficiary of their endeavours.
If all this were indeed the object of the exercise, »Europe« would be an odd 
name for it, since that word seems to denote a culture historically much 
concerned with sovereignty, politics and the government of the self by pro­
cesses in which the self is active in both practice and knowledge. Indeed, the 
name »Europe« might itself be at risk, since there is nothing in it particularly 
sacrosanct to the world market, and you might discover, as others have, that 
global economic forces saw no reason to maintain you, or your history or your 
identity, in being any longer. Your objective is after all to ensure a dominant 
place for »Europe« in the global economy, and ensure that Americans or 
Asians do not dominate it to the point of dominating you. In using the language 
o f global economy, therefore, you are invoking universal forces for particular 
ends. There is nothing new or unusual in that, though I confess I enjoy pointing 
it out to you.
But what makes »Europe« after 1989 so strange and fascinating a spectacle is 
that the denationalising and depoliticising triumph of the global market (the 
End o f History, as it has been called) is for the moment a utopia-though many 
very real and enormously powerful forces are working to make it come true. If 
there was one thing which the great Scottish, French and German philosophers 
of Enlightened period and its revolutionary aftermath knew quite clearly, it 
was that state and society, an effective civil sovereign and an effective civil 
culture, went together; they needed one another, and neither could play its part 
in making civil existence tolerable without its counterpart. The history of the 
next two centuries-revolution, imperialism, world war, gulag and holocaust -  
is of course largely a history o f the number of ways in which that perception 
could go wrong. Nevertheless, what makes the present moment in history, and 
in the invention of Europe, extraordinary and interesting is the spectacle of this 
understanding o f politics confronted by a double challenge to ist perception of 
the state. In the wake o f the disintegration of empires -  colonial, I should add, 
as well as communist -  we have, on the one hand, a constellation of societies 
so far rendered affluent by the global consumer economy that they believe, or 
affect with fluctuating self-doubt to believe, that they can dispense with the 
internal as well as the external sovereignty of the political structure and rely on 
the global economy unfettered to provide all the conditions necessary to civil 
society -  which may or may not be what that economy aims at doing. On the 
other hand we have -  divided from the affluent by a diversity o f lines separat­
ing east from west, or south from north, or inner cities from outer suburbs -  a
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great variety o f human subcultures in which neither state nor civil society is 
stabilised to the point where their alliance can be maintained without degener­
ating into disorder, despotism or both. It would be very easy indeed to depict a 
»Europe« neither virginal nor imperial, uneasily poised between one aspect 
(mainly western) on which the alliance o f state and society has got so far that it 
is possible to imagine the state as growing superfluous, and another (some­
times southern and sometimes eastern) on which neither state nor civil society 
is secure, stabilised or even properly understood. It would be easy, with less 
assurance, to set up a parallelogram of forces and predict that between these 
extremes, the classical components o f the liberal state -  the civil sovereign and 
the community of citizens -  will have to awake from their »stupid and pam­
pered lethargy« without falling into any of that condition's more appalling 
opposites. But historians learn not to make predictions, at least without adding 
that what happens will almost certainly be other that what can be predicted; 
and predictive models are supposed to stimulate, not to constrain, our sense of 
what is possible. My aim has been to deconstruct a concept o f »Europe« too 
easily used as a mind -  deadening incantation, and demonstrate that it is a 
name for a number of forces which interact unstably, dynamically, creatively 
ad dangerously. We -  which includes you, vous autres Européens -  live, as 
always, in interesting times.
